COMCO issues draft guidance on competition law enforcement in labour markets
In July 2024, the Secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission (“COMCO”) concluded a preliminary investigation with findings of illegal agreements in the labour market concerning more than 200 companies in different sectors. At that time, the COMCO Secretariat announced that it would develop best practices to clarify which behaviours comply with competition law and which do not.
The first draft of this widely-awaited guidance has been published today, with a consultation period until 30 September 2026.
Published: 23 July 2026
Partner, Head of Competition
Partner & Managing Partner, Head of Competition
Partner, Head of ESG
Partner, Head of Intellectual Property
Associate
| Published: 23 July 2026 | ||
| AUTHORS |
Marcel Meinhardt |
Partner, Head of Competition |
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Benoît Merkt |
Partner & Managing Partner, Head of Competition |
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Astrid Waser |
Partner, Head of ESG |
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Sevan Antreasyan |
Partner, Head of Intellectual Property |
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Valentin Muller |
Associate |
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| Expertise |
Competition and Regulated Markets |
Introduction
On 23 July 2026, the COMCO Secretariat released for public consultation its draft Note pertaining to agreements affecting competition on labour markets (the “Note”).
This initiative follows a preliminary investigation launched in December 2022 into potentially anti-competitive behaviour in the banking sector, which was subsequently extended to other industries. In July 2024, the Secretariat reported that over 200 companies across multiple sectors had regularly exchanged detailed salary and employment information for years outside the framework of social partnership and collective bargaining agreements. The Secretariat has since engaged with federal and cantonal authorities, employer associations, and trade unions to develop best practices clarifying conducts that are compliant with competition law and those that are not.
The resulting Note is the first guidance by the COMCO on labour markets enforcement.
Key points of the Note
Scope of the Swiss Cartel Act: The Swiss Cartel Act “CartA” applies to all actors of labours markets, including unions, professional associations, authorities, and independent employers (excluding employees themselves and, accordingly, agreements between an employer and its own employees). While the CartA does not provide any general exclusion for labour markets, the two following specificities – which are particularly relevant in the Swiss context – are to be considered:
- Social partnership exception: Collective bargaining negotiations and collective labour agreements (“CLA”) conducted between employers and trade unions within the framework of social partnership are exempt from the CartA. Agreements concluded outside the social partnership framework (e.g. without involving employee representatives) or outside the scope of the CLA's content and implementation remain subject to competition law.
- Apprenticeship market: Recommendations on apprentice compensation that contribute to the proper functioning of the dual vocational training system are generally justified. However, agreements that go beyond the general-interest educational mission and restrict competition for the recruitment of apprentices may be subject to the CartA.
Wage-fixing agreements: Agreements or concerted practices between employers concerning wages or other elements of remuneration (including bonuses, salary structures, and fringe benefits) constitute horizontal agreements under Article 4(1) CartA. The Note provides that such agreements may qualify as hardcore price-fixing (Article 5(3)(a) CartA), and could thus lead to direct sanctions.
No-poach agreements: Agreements by which companies undertake not to hire, actively recruit, or solicit employees from other companies, including sector-wide arrangements and recommendations by professional or employer associations, may be treated as quantity restrictions or market allocation agreements (Article 5(3)(b) and (c) CartA), and could thus lead to direct sanctions.
Exchange of sensitive information: According to the Note, the exchange between competitors of information such as individual salaries, internal salary ranges, current or planned salary increases, bonus structures, recruitment strategies, headcount reduction plans, or future employment conditions may reduce uncertainty about competitors’ market behaviour and facilitate coordination. The more recent, detailed, and individualised the information, the higher the risk that the situation be considered as an unlawful competition agreement under Articles 4(1) and 5 CartA, i.e. not necessarily leading to direct sanctions. Conversely, aggregated, anonymised, and sufficiently aged data would generally not raise concerns.
Benchmarking: While comparative analyses of compensation data, personnel turnover, and recruitment processes may serve legitimate economic objectives, they must be structured carefully to avoid competition law risks. The design of benchmarking systems, including the degree of aggregation, anonymisation, and the age of data, determines whether they raise concerns in light of Articles 4(1) and 5 CartA.
According to the Note, the individual circumstances must be considered; the legal assessment depends on the specific nature and actual or potential effects of the agreement on competition.
Practical implications for businesses
The Note carries significant practical implications for practices having an effect in Switzerland. While the Note indicates that competition authorities will exercise restraint in labour markets, it also confirms that they will intervene against clearly anti-competitive conduct. Companies should therefore consider the following:
Review existing practices: Companies that may be party to potential wage-fixing or no-poach agreements, as well as those participating in any type of information exchanges with competitors on compensation and recruitment strategies or benchmarking, should assess whether these arrangements may give rise to competition law risks in light of the Note.
Companies should also ensure that they take recruitment, compensation, and HR policy decisions independently.
Leniency and self-reporting: The COMCO Secretariat’s existing leniency regime for spontaneous self-reporting applies to labour market infringements. Companies involved in potentially problematic arrangements may wish to consider early engagement with the authorities.
Outlook
The Note provides first guidance of COMCO regarding labour market related behaviour, reflecting a broader international trend among competition authorities that are increasingly scrutinising labour market practices.
Interested associations, companies, and individuals may submit comments to the COMCO Secretariat by 30 September 2026. The final version of the note will be published by the end of 2026, ahead of the entry into force of the revised Cartel Act in 2027. Although the final version of the Note may differ from the current draft, companies should act now to review and, where necessary, consider adjusting their employment-related practices and information-sharing arrangements.
Legal Note
Legal Note: The information contained in this newsletter is of general nature and does not constitute legal advice. Please do not hesitate to contact us in case of any questions.
Let’s talk
| CONTACTS |
Marcel Meinhardt |
Partner, Head of Competition, Zurich marcel.meinhardt@lenzstaehelin.com Tel: +41 58 450 80 00 |
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Benoît Merkt |
Partner & Managing Partner, Head of Competition, Geneva benoit.merkt@lenzstaehelin.com Tel: +41 58 450 70 00 |
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Astrid Waser |
Partner, Head of ESG, Zurich astrid.waser@lenzstaehelin.com Tel: +41 58 450 80 00 |
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Sevan Antreasyan |
Partner, Head of Intellectual Property, Geneva sevan.antreasyan@lenzstaehelin.com Tel: +41 58 450 70 00 |
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Anja Affolter Marino |
Partner, Head of Employment, Pensions and Immigration, Zurich anja.affoltermarino@lenzstaehelin.com Tel: +41 58 450 80 00 |
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Laure Baumann |
Counsel, Head of Employment, Pensions and Immigration, Geneva laure.baumann@lenzstaehelin.com Tel: +41 58 450 70 00 |